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Abstract
Large technical systems (LTS) are integral to modern lifestyles but arduous
to analyze. In this paper, we advance a conceptualization of LTS using the
notion of mature “phases,” drawing from insights into innovation studies,
science and technology studies, political science, the sociology of infra-
structure, history of technology, and governance. We begin by defining LTS
as a unit of analysis and explaining its conceptual utility and novelty, situating
it among other prominent sociotechnical theories. Next, we argue that
after LTS have moved through the (overlapping) phases proposed by
Thomas Hughes of invention, expansion, growth, momentum, and style,
1Department of Business Development and Technology, Aarhus University, Herning, Denmark
2Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), School of Business, Management, and Economics,
University of Sussex, Sussex, United Kingdom
Corresponding Author:
Benjamin K. Sovacool, Department of Business Development and Technology, Aarhus Uni-
versity, Birk Centerpark 15, DK-7400 Herning, Denmark.
Email: sovacool@vt.edu
Science, Technology, & Human Values
1-32
ª The Author(s) 2018
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0162243918768074
journals.sagepub.com/home/sth
mature LTS undergo the additional (overlapping) phases of reconfiguration,
contestation (subject to pressures such as drift and crisis), and eventually
stagnation and decline. We illustrate these analytical phases with historical
case studies and the conceptual literature, and close by suggesting future
research to refine and develop the LTS framework, particularly related to
more refined typologies, temporal dimensions, and a broadening of system
users. We aim to contribute to theoretical debates about the coevolution
of LTS as well as empirical discussions about system-related use, socio-
technical change, and policy-making.
Keywords
sociotechnical networks, history of technology, large-scale infrastructure,
megaprojects
From birthing babies to managing old age, most of us remain intricately
connected to large-scale, capital-intensive infrastructures (Misa 2003, 4)
that are sometimes referred to as large technical systems (LTS). LTS are
“machineries and freestanding structures performing, more or less reliably
and predictably, complex standardized operations by virtue of being inte-
grated with other social processes, governed and legitimated by formal,
knowledge-intensive, impersonal rationalities” (Joerges 1988, 24).
LTS have become central to the modern human experience, yet they
puzzle researchers and “confound engineers, social scientists, historians,
economists, policy planners, and political leaders” (LaPorte 1991a, 1-2).
Indeed, over time, LTS as a unit of analysis and the systems theories that
informed their study have become less prevalent in the fields of science and
technology studies (STS) and the history of technology. A “first wave” or
“new direction” of LTS scholarship from Hughes (1983, 1986, 1987), La
Porte (1991b), Go¨kalp (1992), Summerton (1994a), and Coutard (1999)
offers much insight but is now decades old. Other recent work (Dafoe
2015; Schubert, Sydow, and Windeler 2013; Van der Vleuten 2004,
2009; Geels 2007) has nibbled on LTS themes but has not advanced an
overarching conceptual framework or modified the “original” phases
offered by Hughes or Go¨kalp. Still other recent work by Turnheim and
Geels (2012) or Schot and Kanger (2018) emphasizes “phase models” to
sustainability transitions, and Kanger and Schot (2016) as well as Schot and
Kanger (2018) articulate “transition dynamics” according to a “start-up
phase,” an “acceleration phase,” and a “stabilization phase” but do not
situate these themes within the context of LTS.
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Such lacunae lead us to ask: is the concept of LTS still useful for under-
standing the dimensions of technology or sociotechnical change? Do mostly
sequential, fairly deterministic, phased conceptualizations of systems stand
up to scrutiny? How do mature LTS evolve or decline? What happens after
the establishment of momentum and style? What mechanisms or dynamics
facilitate the further evolution or dissolution of LTS?
Our aim in answering these questions is to provoke more reflective
thinking on LTS—exploring whether it still presents a useful conceptuali-
zation, how it may be modified to include recent intellectual developments,
and how it can be further improved. We argue that mature LTS can move
through the additional phases of reconfiguration, contestation (subject to
pressures such as drift and crisis), and eventual stagnation and decline. To
support our development of these analytical phases, we draw extensively
from historical case studies as well as the conceptual literature. We aim to
contribute to theoretical debates about the evolution of LTS as well as
empirical discussions about system related use, governance, and policy-
making. We also explicate hopeful new research directions for those seek-
ing to further engage with the LTS heuristic.
LTS: From Definitions to Conceptual Utility
and Novelty
Although readers of this journal may be familiar with some of these
themes, here we outline the LTS concept, explain its use, and discuss its
operationalization through five key attributes before we argue why it
remains conceptually useful. We then seek to expand and elaborate com-
ponents of LTS theory.
Defining an LTS: Society, Scale, Coordination, Variation,
and Obduracy
Despite repeated attempts, the literature does not offer a concise or uni-
versal definition of LTS (Hughes 1983, 1987, 1992). Van der Vleuten
(2004) argues that there is no agreement concerning what constitutes LTS,
with some talking about “society-wide infrastructures,” others “nodes and
junctions,” and still others “material superstructures” or “loosely coupled
systems.” In later work, Van der Vleuten (2006, 281) even notes that he
“cannot offer the reader a strict definition of large technical systems here,
simply because there is no consensus.” Here, we argue that LTS have four
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attributes: they are sociotechnical, large, coordinated, and varied. Mature
systems, in addition, are obdurate.
The social and technical elements of LTS are diverse, including tech-
nological infrastructure as well as political, regulatory, financial, educa-
tional, and other social dimensions. To offer two examples: LTS for
electricity will involve not only coal mines, power plants, electric trans-
mission and distribution lines, transformers, and pylons but also financing
institutions, regulatory bodies, technical universities, electrical engineers,
and residential and commercial users. LTS for transport will involve not
only cars and roads but also traffic signals, fuel stations and refineries, the
maintenance industry, registration offices, insurance companies, drivers,
passengers, and even police and legal networks. To be sure, this concep-
tualization complements a longer line of historical thinkers all positing
that many activities possess a “sociotechnicality” highlighting integration
of physical hardware with the human environment or software needed to
utilize it (Trist and Bamforth 1951; Emery and Trist 1960; White 1962;
Trist 1981; Hughes 1983).
In scale—LTS are spatially expansive and capital intensive. They
require billions or even trillions of dollars of investment and occupy sub-
stantial areas of the physical environment. LTS therefore involve and
change the social lives of large numbers of people; some, like early rail-
roads, even restructured social life and conceptions of space-time, some-
thing Go¨kalp (1988) termed a secteur-reseau (network sector) to denote its
macrolevel influence. Not all LTS may be deeply penetrating, but the idea is
that LTS are big and dominating in their reach.
LTS are also coordinated “goal-seeking systems” (Hughes 1983, 80),
composed of related parts, nodes, or components that are structured or
connected, often centrally, to achieve some sort of task. Van der Vleuten
(2006) adds that LTS structure various social, educational, scientific, and
even religious subsystems, making them centrally coordinated and hier-
archically organized. This arrangement creates significant “junctions”
where systems can overlap and interact, leading to collaboration (such as
when maritime navigation or air transport is connected to land transport via
harbors and airports) to cooperation (when railway systems are interlaced
with electricity supply systems). But LTS retain a goal-seeking or func-
tional nature even as it may compete with other LTS.
LTS have varied technical architectures that organize interactions
among diverse actors and technologies to accomplish a variety of purposes.
Some LTS distribute water or electricity, others accumulate waste or sew-
age, and still others organize communication or transportation. This variety
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leads to variations in form and function, governance, institutional manage-
ment, and style (or cultural variation), both within and across systems.
The fifth and final attribute of LTS, which arises in their maturity, is
obduracy, or resistance to change (Hommels 2008). Hughes (1983, 15)
described this characteristic as “momentum,” or as a mass of “machines,
devices, structures” and “business concerns, government agencies, pro-
fessional societies, educational institutions and other organizations” that
“have a perceptible rate of growth or velocity.” Joerges (1988) termed it
“dynamic inertia,” others refer to it as “path dependence” or “lock-in”
(Kirsch 2000; Unruh 2000). These terms all describe how LTS continue
along a given path, reflecting the actions of numerous stakeholders such
as educational and regulatory institutions, engineering and equipment
suppliers, and the work and culture of people working within an industry.
Managers of LTS contribute to inertia by remaining in control and resist-
ing new and disruptive technologies (Rip 1995). Since momentum and
inertia tend to direct systems along established lines of development,
Hughes (1983) points out that it takes massive contingencies, such as
war, to disrupt that momentum. Others, such as Hirsh (1999), note that
social and regulatory movements, tied with technological change, can
also alter momentum significantly.
Conceptual Utility: Structure, Agency, and Meaning in LTS Evolution
What makes LTS a valuable concept, given other advances in sociotechni-
cal conceptualizing? The central focus of LTS theory is the system itself,
and so applications of LTS thinking tend to emphasize structure, or how
LTS exert a “soft determinism” that constrains human agency and influ-
ences meaning or discourse (Sovacool and Hess 2017). Hughes (1989) even
argued that modern American society was built of intertwined LTS that laid
a material foundation for an entire civilization—the LTS essentially influ-
enced social change. LTS reflect “deep structures” in society that can
surpass natural geography or politics as key drivers of societal change (Van
der Vleuten 2006; Van der Vleuten et al. 2007). Although they may over-
emphasize successful top-down alignment of systems and underemphasize
conflict and failure, LTS theories convey the notion that technology can
have deterministic effects. For example, the operation of LTS involving
fossil-fueled electricity or transport cause greenhouse gas emissions and
life-endangering pollution, and the design of Dutch drainage canal networks
shaped patterns of human habitation and agricultural productivity for cen-
turies to come. Soft determinism does not necessarily mean LTS will
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forcefully dictate social change, only that they can act as a “force field” for
such changes.
LTS theory assumes that such systems undergo mostly sequential
phases. Although he suggests they overlap and are not always linear,
Hughes (1983, 1987) proposed that LTS progress approximately
through phases from invention and technology transfer to growth
before becoming directed by established momentum and style. Inven-
tion and development occur when an inventor or entrepreneur thinks
that a novel product, good, or service has significantly improved char-
acteristics or uses and so develops it, and then makes the necessary
connections with engineers and financers. For those inventions that
develop beyond the first phase, what Hughes called technology transfer
occurs—the successful diffusion or exportation of a technology across
space or between societies. The phase of growth refers to extending the
scale, scope, or speed of the system, increasing capacity use and other
performance measures; it is more difficult to characterize, as it relates
to the deepening and specialization of systems. The phase or mechan-
ism of momentum building includes notions of lock in and incumbency
that come to foreclose choices and trajectories so that system develop-
ment is based upon past conditions and decisions. The phase of style
emphasizes that LTS can exhibit a distinct style formed by conditions
beyond or external to the system itself (including geography, economic
structure, cultural values, legislation, and contingent historical factors).
However, while LTS theory concerns itself mostly with macrotechnical
or deep structure and phases of development, there is also space for
agency and meaning. LTS involve individual or organizational/collective
system builders who, at times, are users of the system as well as designers.
The work and art of system building reveals the human mechanisms of
LTS, and gives rise to useful concepts such as reverse salient (compo-
nent(s) out of equilibrium impeding system performance) or load factor
(extent of system capacity used in delivering a product or process). Van
der Vleuten et al. (2007, 4) note that the notion of system building
“humanizes” infrastructure studies and history, and replaces the tradi-
tional “heroic” narrative of brilliant inventors with a more complex nar-
rative of dedicated teams of system builders. As they write, “The system
builder concept . . . invites historians to follow key actors as they routinely
cross disciplinary boundaries and engage in transdisciplinary problem
solving while building sociotechnical systems.”
LTS theory also enables the analysis of meaning and discourse as they
arise in system evolution. In their review of the wider LTS literature, Van
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der Vleuten et al. (2007) found that system builders often framed their
infrastructure discursively or connected it to broader rhetorical or ideolo-
gical agendas. This element opens up LTS inquiry not only around patterns
of structure and agency but communication strategies, promises and expec-
tations, and the negotiated and contested rhetorical politics of system
development.
These features distinguish LTS theory from other sociotechnical con-
cepts. As Table 1 shows, the multilevel perspective (MLP) analyzes socio-
technical transitions but emphasizes regimes, dominant routines, and
alternative spaces or niches. While it discusses global or landscape trends,
it is far less deterministic—and linear—than LTS thinking. The MLP also
has a different actor concept: system change is not happening because of the
work of system builders as such but because of the emergence of niches and
exploitation by networks of actors. Actor Network Theory invokes concepts
such as “network assemblages” and “sociotechnical imbroglios” but
focuses more on agency or politics, especially at the microlevel. The Social
Construction of Technology (SCOT) emphasizes closure, frames, and the
meaning groups of stakeholders give to technology. SCOT focuses on the
evolution of particular technologies rather than the evolution of a system,
and it looks less at how that system shapes and constrains agency and
evolves over time. Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) do assess com-
plexity and variation in large systems but prioritize the functional aspects of
innovation. TIS theories tend not to discuss sociotechnical change in the
“big picture” perspective of all other approaches and instead link to the
shorter time management of innovation in particular sectors (five to fifteen
years’ time horizon).
Novelty: Theorizing Mature LTS
The balance of the paper explores the evolution of LTS beyond the five
phases articulated by Hughes, and how such an extension offers benefits for
understanding modern technological enterprises. It suggests that LTS can
may be reconfigured as system builders adapt to dynamic challenges to
retain control or extend quality of service, system reach, or volume. Con-
testation occurs when control or function is challenged. Decline occurs
when a system deteriorates. We explore each of these phases using histor-
ical cases to develop concepts for the study of mature LTS. Our notion of
phases recognizes that technology is not freely transferrable from one sit-
uation to another but instead mediated, acquired, appropriated, and modi-
fied. Table 2 provides an overview of our framework.
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Reconfiguration: Linking, Selection, and Repositioning
Although mature LTS can create powerful feedback mechanisms that resist
change, these are neither inevitable nor fully deterministic. Over time, LTS
evolve and at times struggle as they face internal and external pressures.
Systems may be reconfigured through territorial interconnection and cross-
linking, unselecting undesirable users, or realigning and dealigning.
Interconnection and Cross-linking
The three types of LTS reconfiguration discussed by Summerton (1994a,
1994b, 1999) offer a useful starting point to understand changes connected
to space, function, and organization. Geographic reconfiguration can occur
Table 2. Phases, Mechanisms, and Empirical Cases for Reconfiguration,
Contestation, and Decline.
Phase/Description Mechanism(s) Case(s)
Reconfiguration: system
adapts to
challenges; control
over system is
mostly stable
Interconnection
and
crosslinking
Railways, electricity grids, and
telecommunications networks
Selectivity Electricity grids, telecommunications
networks, and gas pipelines
Repositioning Sewer systems, ocean freight and
marine transport, land transport,
industrial manufacturing, and natural
gas systems
Contestation: system is
in limbo; control
over system is
challenged
Drift South African electricity, shale gas in
Eastern Europe, and
telecommunications in the United
States and United Kingdom
Crisis American flood control, British railways
Stagnation and decline:
system growth
declines or erodes;
quality of service or
volume
deteriorates;
control over system
is lost
Substitution and
transformation
French railways, electric streetcars
(trolleys) in the United States, and
coal in the United Kingdom
Source: Authors.
Note: Particular mechanisms often appear across multiple phases. However, phases reflect
where certain mechanisms dominate.
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with territorial expansion and interconnection of similar systems across
political boundaries. Summerton calls this the territorial coupling of auton-
omous systems, or a meeting of the systems, whereby independent regional
or national systems are physically connected and standardized. This type is
primarily about transforming systems into national and international ones,
reconfiguring their geographic size in ways that may include growth or
shrinkage. Functional reconfiguration occurs during attempts at full-
system integration or organizational mergers that combine complementary
parts of different systems into a new whole such as transportation systems
altered by linkages with communication and energy systems (e.g., tele-
graphs, electricity, and railways). A final type of reconfiguration occurs
when monopoly systems reorganize by blurring their institutional borders
rather than by altering spatial or function boundaries. Regardless of whether
reconfiguration is spatial, functional, or organizational, Summerton argues
that LTS interlink in ways that allow actors to integrate and coordinate
complementary resources and skills, without sacrificing autonomy or con-
trol, to harmonize interests and/or maximize profits.
Exemplary cases of reconfiguration involve telecommunications follow-
ing the fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany (Robischon 1994), the co-
development of electricity and railway (Mulder and Kaijser 2014), and the
liberalization of the European electricity sector (Markard and Truffer
2006). In other cases, LTS can be suddenly delinked. An example here is
the Cold War, which Misa and Schot (2005) interpret as “delinking” trans-
port, energy, and communication systems in the middle of geographic
Europe. Such boundary changes represent a sudden shift in the center of
gravity of LTS, redirecting their trajectory. They bring with them changes
in actors, knowledge bases, interests in the system, and the characterization
of the environment at the system boundary (i.e., its position within the
society it serves).
Selectivity
The cross-linking and interconnection of LTS into larger scales that serve
bigger geographical territories is not only about space or scale—it can
empower system operators or owners to more easily shape the markets they
serve. Such expansion can enable more strategic activity designed to
increase profits for operators and financiers. Once networks reach a certain
size, it becomes possible to increase profitability by concentrating only on
the most lucrative customers and markets, something Guy, Graham, and
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Marvin (1996) and Guy, Graham, and Marvin (1997) term “cherry-
picking”; or to “dump” unprofitable market segments.
In the United Kingdom, the expansion of electricity, natural gas, and
telecommunications networks enabled utilities to focus on large commer-
cial users and more coverage in market “hot spots.” For instance, Guy,
Graham, and Marvin (1999) note that interconnection made possible the
process of “social dumping,” empowering service providers to ease out of
unprofitable areas, letting go of marginal customers who are no longer
essential to profits such as those in rural areas or impoverished pockets
of the inner cities. Graham and Marvin (1994) similarly documented social
dumping practices such as line rental and service charges, high deposits or
prepayment systems, and disconnection of the poorest customers among
UK utilities. Graham (1997) identified social dumping practices such as
socially regressive tariff rebalancing, “self-disconnecting” prepayment
meters, and “smart” meters. Essentially, making LTS larger can embolden
operators to withdraw from zones of unprofitable activity. Moreover, when
new consumers become dependent on the newly expanded system, opera-
tors and owners can begin to push them to modify their patterns of con-
sumption and habits in order to increase use and/or profitability.
Patterns of selectivity are not limited only to Europe. Kline (2002) and
Cannon (2000) noted a tendency for companies in the United States erect-
ing electricity networks into rural areas in the 1930s and 1940s to “skim
the cream” by rapidly moving to supply densely populated areas or
wealthy farmers, and avoiding more sparsely populated areas or poorer
communities. British Gas and BT in the United Kingdom have also
attempted to selectively pick international segments of customers via
strategic arrangements with service companies in global markets (Graham
and Marvin 1994).
Repositioning
Multiple causal drivers can force LTS into reconfiguration (Geels 2007),
drivers that we place under the umbrella term of “repositioning.” Beyond
changes responding to underlying problems within the system that acquire
the urgent attention of managers, there are challenges emanating from
outside the system. Examples include concerns about safety or environmen-
tal externalities, changing competitive environments, political contingen-
cies, or shifts in cultural values and consumer behavior. At some point,
these can create pressure and shock LTS into various transition pathways
(Geels and Schot 2007; Schot and Geels 2008). Geels and Schot (2007)
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present a typology, summarized in Table 3, based upon the extent and speed
of environmental shifts and upon the system’s readiness to adjust.
Geels and Schot (2007) offer numerous examples illustrating repositioning
through these pathways. The transition in the Netherlands from cesspools to
sewer systems depended on the emergence of new social norms about cleanli-
ness, and system development responded directly by incorporating rules about
disease and waste, altering the role of public authority, and changing waste
disposal practices. The transition from sailing ships to steam ships in Britain
illustrates a pathway of technological substitution, keeping the main incum-
bents of oceanic freight in control. The transition from traditional factories to
mass production typifies a reconfiguration pathway, as it relied on the replace-
ment of manual or animal labor with automated machinery, assembly lines,
and mechanization. The transition from horses to automobiles shows the
development path of an existing systemundermined, and a considerable period
of uncertainty before the system builders, knowledge bases, and a system
development trajectory around automobiles became established.
Geels and Schot (2007) frame their discussion in terms of sociotechnical
transitions; as a result, they restrict discussion of the means of establishing
new rules for system development to the creation and expansion of a pro-
tected space or niche. When applied to LTS, we can acknowledge other
Table 3. Features of Repositioning Described as Sociotechnical Transition
Pathways.
Pathway Main Actor(s) Types of Interaction
Transformation Regime actors, outside
groups, and social
movements
Outsiders voice criticism, and
incumbent actors adjust regime
rules
Technological
substitution
Incumbent firms, new
firms
Newcomers develop novelties that
compete with regime technologies
Reconfiguration Regime actors, suppliers Regime actors adopt component—
innovations, developed by new
suppliers; competition occurs
between old and new suppliers
Dealignment
and
realignment
New niche actors Changes in deep structure create
strong pressures that challenge faith
and legitimacy, followed by the
emergence of multiple novelties and
competition; eventually one wins,
leading to restabilization
Source: Modified from Geels and Schot (2007).
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ways for those rules to be established. For example, new development
practices can arrive through the entry of new system builders with different
interests and practices, perhaps applied or developed coherently in another
setting. Alternatively, new opportunities for LTS, such as new sources of
system inputs, can provoke realignment processes, and they can be
responded to without protected spaces or niches, a case in point being
Kaijser’s (1999) study of changes to the gas industry in the Netherlands.
Such LTS pathways can provoke different social responses. La Porte
(1991a) has noted four distinct and, at times, contradictory responses.
Some societies respond by giving operators complete, independent control.
Some develop governmental subsidies and legal protections that sponsor tech-
nological growth. Others develop analytical capacity to forecast the effects of
systems in an attempt to design away undesirable effects. Still others create
regulations to moderate the behavior of system operators, and some enforce
punitive economic and legal regulations after damage of systems become
evident. These social responses can further alter LTS development and add
to the complexity and variety of the possible paths of repositioning.
Contestation: Drift and Crisis
LTS undergoing reconfiguration do not always result in consensus—they
can invoke compromise or at other times outright conflict and contestation.
The stakeholder frames attached to LTS become fragmented to the point
where they clash; where a lack of “cognitive consensus” (Schot 1992, 20)
about function or meaning arises. This relationship between contestation
and reconfiguration is iterative and dynamic: sometimes, contestation can
shift systems closer to decline (a negative impact on the system); in other
situations, it can shift them back toward reconfiguration (a positive impact).
Interestingly, this dynamic relationship has been captured by emerging
work in the sociology of infrastructure. Bolton and Foxon (2015) write that
many LTS go through an “infrastructural lifecycle,” as they call it, which is
cyclical—it involves a constant didactic process of decay and renewal. This
notion of cyclical development is also encapsulated by Go¨kalp (1992) who
writes that sometimes contestation can lead to decline, but in other situa-
tions, it can convince system managers to adopt the characteristics of new
innovation “threats” so that they are contained and utilized to affirm the
revitalization of the older system. Sovacool et al. (2017) similarly noted
how incumbents in the automotive industry sought to “contain” emerging
innovations in electric mobility related to vehicle range and charging.
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In the remainder of this section, we talk about two particular mechanisms
that can provoke contestation: drift and crisis. To recap: contestation refers
to the challenge of control over the system, where entities dispute, contest,
compete, and contend some aspect of LTS functioning, placing them in
stasis or jeopardy. Decline refers to when LTS exhibit stagnation or declin-
ing growth, often because control over a system is lost. Decline can happen
through various means without contestation, and not all contestation can
lead to decline.
Drift
The term “drift” initially stems from institutional theorists describing
efforts by incumbents holding on to the status quo despite major shifts in
contextual relevance (Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen 2013; Streeck and The-
len 2005). Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen (2013, 28) elaborate that with drift,
change occurs not as an “electoral spectacle” or “big legislative battle” but
instead away from public oversight and through quieter, less-prominent
channels. Drift suggests that mature LTS are constantly maintaining their
suitability to their present context, but this often entails clashes with groups
of actors with divergent interests. Drift occurs when relevant social groups
wage a battle or contest for control over the system, or when system opera-
tors or developers take an overly cautious, even counterproductive approach
to steering LTS, what Lorenz (1994) called “collective conservatism.”
Three historical examples of drift relate to centralized electricity networks
in South Africa, natural gas networks in Eastern Europe, and telecommu-
nications in the United Kingdom and United States.
South Africa’s electricity supply system reveals how an entrenched
incumbent, Eskom, has come to find itself in drift, faced with the growing
influence of independent power producers. Eskom is the state-owned, ver-
tically integrated monopoly with regulatory and technical control over
almost all of South Africa’s electricity system, including power plants,
transmission and distribution networks, tariffs, and licenses (Ting 2018).
Eskom has ambitious plans to further enlarge its system via investments in
regional power pools and pan-African electricity supply centered on large-
scale hydroelectric dams (Green, Sovacool, and Hancock 2015). Starting in
2008, Eskom’s control has been challenged by decentralized, independent
power providers, often relying on renewable sources of supply such as wind
turbines and solar photovoltaics. Under the 2011 Renewable Energy Inde-
pendent Power Producers Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP), more than
5,000 MW of capacity across seventy-seven independent power projects
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has been procured. This has resulted in renewable energy bid prices for
solar photovoltaic panels and onshore wind turbines dropping by more than
50 percent in three years (Ting 2018). Eskom has attempted to reassert
control over rules concerning interconnection and integrated resource plan-
ning by delaying and resisting the conclusion of power purchase agreements
emerging from RE IPPPP. Contestation between Eskom and renewable
energy developers is placing the sector in limbo. The dominant centralized
grid dynamic of the system is losing significance, and distributed renew-
ables, especially rooftop solar panels, are gaining influence. At present, it is
not certain whether drift will result in the reconfiguration of the incumbent
or the beginning of stagnation.
Similarly, drift describes the fragmentation of consensus related to the
system of natural gas networks—involving horizontal drilling sites, produc-
tion facilities, transmission and distribution pipelines, and end-use facilities
such as industrial enterprises (chemicals, steel, refining, compression, and
liquefaction), power generation, and even direct household use (gas for
cooking)—in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. These countries face the
choice of embracing shale gas into their LTS as a domestic source of energy
against the backdrop of Russia serving as the dominant gas supplier (Gold-
thau and Sovacool 2016). Powerful stakeholders in industry and govern-
ment have been backing a shale gas sector based on the reindustrialization
of the economy that it could provide, along with geopolitical stability by
displacing Russian imports. Conversely, equally influential stakeholders
with competing industries (such as those for renewable energy) and civil
society groups have countered that shale gas threatens water quality and
availability, risks chemical pollution, and will accelerate species loss and
the destruction of habitats. They also note that shale gas production merely
transfers wealth and revenue out of domestic economies to foreign actors. It
is yet unclear whether this contestation will lead to the decline or reconfi-
guration of shale gas supply within the energy system.
Telecommunications in the United Kingdom and United States (Davies
1996) is a final example of drift. There, a contest for control manifested
during the 1970s and 1980s as an “electronic alliance” of large corporate
telecommunications users and electronic data processing companies pushed
for deregulation and restructuring. These efforts ran up against a “postal–
industrial complex” composed of a coalition of telephone companies,
national equipment suppliers, and trade unions. Such conflict placed the
system in relative drift to the point where new business models and tech-
nologies, namely, cellular telephone and digital providers of Internet ser-
vices, were able to threaten the hierarchical and centralized network of
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landline telephones. This contest led to reconfiguration: the evolution of a
new hybrid system whereby overlapping local access networks controlled
by different operators act as the spokes feeding traffic into high-capacity
hubs.
Crisis
Crisis occurs when LTS are placed into contestation rapidly over a major
accident or external event.
British rail networks offer an illustrative case example. Shortly after
railway privatization and restructuring (1993-1997), a series of railway
accidents with fatalities occurred. Investigations into these incidents
found problems with infrastructure maintenance and control of contrac-
tors (Cullen 2000, 3-4). The Hatfield accident (October 17, 2000) is con-
sidered a watershed moment for the sector. Caused by a broken rail, the
accident “threw the industry into something resembling organized chaos”
(Gourvish 2008, 59). The accident prompted the introduction of speed
restrictions across the rail network: eighty-one sites had emergency speed
restrictions added on the day of the accident; a week later, 1,850 sites with
cracks had been found and speed restrictions were introduced at 272 sites.
By the end of November, cracked rail sites were up to 3,400 and 850 had
speed restrictions (Gourvish 2008, 68). The problems identified by the
accident resulted in significant institutional and financial restructuring of
the entire railway system.
In other situations, natural disasters can lead to crises that prompt recon-
figuration. Consider the system involving flood protection or “flood hazard
mitigation” surrounding New Orleans, LA. When Hurricane Katrina struck
New Orleans in August 2005, the storm breached the floodwall of the
Lower Ninth Ward, causing multiple other levees and flood barriers to fail,
ultimately covering more than 80 percent of the city in water as high as ten
meters. The federal government allocated billions of dollars to the Army
Corps of Engineers to fix, upgrade, and rehabilitate about 220 miles of
levees and floodwalls, floodgates, pump stations, and canals, spending a
budget of $14 billion (Sovacool and Linne´r 2015). This led to a radical
reconfiguration of flood-level protection. To expedite repairs, environmen-
tal and air pollution standards were curtailed so that hazardous wastes were
not properly stored and bans on open burning lifted (Sovacool and Linne´r
2015). The rebuilding of canals and roads further eroded environmental
buffers (such as wetlands) critical to future storm surge mitigation (Sova-
cool and Linne´r 2015). Repairs were never fully implemented by the US
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Army Corps of Engineers in levees closest to many rural and minority
areas, meaning people moved back into unsafe areas (Sovacool and Linne´r
2015). Reassurances offered by public officials about the safety of the
reconfigured system resulted in a pattern of rebuilding, which integrated
living patterns within levees and protective infrastructure such as canals,
polders, and dikes, in actuality undermining their ability to withstand the
impacts of severe storms (Kates et al. 2006). Thus, the system was recon-
figured in ways that increased the inequality of protection. By diffusing
responsibility for flood protection (Wetmore 2007), the system masked
the way it redistributed risk among vulnerable people. A positive outcome
is that it did provoke “new imaginings” about managerial visions of flood
control that created a sense of disturbance, crisis, and political damage
(Hilgartner 2007).
Stagnation and Decline
The final phase is that of decline: when LTS see growth slow and stagnate,
eventually coming to be displaced or substituted by other competing systems.
Decline can be absolute, compared to previous levels of system plateaus,
especially when they suffer from technological stasis (Hirsh 1989), or relative
to other competing LTS (Lorenz 1994). Although decline can be a matter of
perspective—one system’s decline may be another’s fruitful reconfigura-
tion—here, we assess decline by using measures such as an actual loss of
service (quality or volume) or a shrinkage of geographic scale. Three exam-
ples are offered: French railways, electric light rail (trams) in the United
States, and the coal supply system in the United Kingdom.
In France, although the rail network hasn’t disappeared completely, the
closure of certain rail lines proceeded in parallel with the accelerated devel-
opment of motorways, trends coupled with a shift in preferences for perso-
nalized, motorized transport in cars and a significant decline in both
numbers of users/volume and the geographic reach of the rail network.
Highways for cars accounted for only about 10 percent of transport of goods
based on land in the 1920s, but this rose dramatically to above 50 percent by
the 1970s; over the same time, the percentage of goods carried by rail
dropped from above 70 percent to below 40 percent. Although some
hypothesized a resurgence of French rail in the early 1990s due to the
development of high-speed lines such as the TGV, Go¨kalp (1992) countered
that in fact improved performance of cars more than offset such a push, with
cars becoming increasingly computerized both in terms of their energy
sources (computer control of combustion) and in terms of their network
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(computer-aided signaling and traffic control). French rail therefore became
largely displaced by French cars.
In the United Kingdom, the coal system involving coalmines, transport
and logistics networks, storage facilities, pollution control devices, coal-
fired power plants, and industrial factories has seen an accelerated decline
from the 1930s to the 2010s. Already in gradual decline over the previous
decades, the negative pressures against coal accelerated in the 1950s as the
coal supply system entered a period of crisis connected to shortages in
supply and rationing, as well as visible environmental calamities such as
the “big smog” of 1952 that resulted in thousands of excess winter deaths
(Fouquet 2012). Public perception shifted to frame coal as old-fashioned,
dirty, and outdated, and government responses such as the passage of the
Clean Air Acts further intensified the rate of mine closers and channeled
investments to fewer enterprises. National energy policy pivoted to a “four-
fuel economy” that saw a greatly reduced role for coal and an encourage-
ment of users to switch to gas for heating (Turnheim and Geels 2012). The
creation of “smokeless zones,” and the prospect of cheap imported oil from
the Middle East, saw an even quickened conversion to other fuels in the
1970s. Intense pressure against coal with the election of a newly Conser-
vative Government led by Margaret Thatcher in 1979, who saw coal (in
particular coal miners) as an example of a monopoly acting against the
efficacy of market forces, continued the decline. The privatization of the
electricity supply industry in the 1990s further hastened the decline of coal,
culminating in a so-called dash for gas that ended up displacing fifty million
tons of coal production (Turnheim and Geels 2012). The industry suffered
“extreme contraction” and employment fell to only 10,000 miners (Fouquet
2008); production of coal dropped precipitously from forty-four million
tons in 1995 to only nine million tons in 2015, as nuclear power and natural
gas further displaced coal for electricity supply.
A third example is the decline in service volume of electric street trolleys
(trams) in the United States, a system involving light rail as well as elec-
tricity, transport, road, and carriage networks. Although public transporta-
tion did not affect most Americans until the arrival of the electric streetcar
in 1888, streetcars developed rapidly after its introduction (Slater 1997). By
World War I, there were few towns of more than 10,000 population without
a streetcar system. Prior to 1920, streetcar use increased steadily, stimulated
by rising incomes, lower real fares, and rapid urban population growth.
These positive influences overcame the negative effect that increased auto-
mobile use had on streetcar ridership. However, threats to streetcar dom-
inance began to emerge around 1914-1916, when gasoline powered
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jitneys—unlicensed, informal taxicabs, very similar to Uber today—made
serious inroads into streetcar ridership until legal maneuvering by the street-
car companies put most of the jitneys out of business. The result however
was a rapid shift to vehicles powered by liquid fuel rather than electricity,
and the impact on the streetcar companies was severe. Some companies lost
as much as 50 percent of their ridership. A more lasting decline was pre-
cipitated by the further refinement of adoption of commercial buses as well
as private cars. The modern motor bus saw fairly systematic innovations to
its chassis and engines, which resulted in improvements in speed, handling,
and comfort. Buses attracted new ridership because they were much faster
and more comfortable than streetcars, particularly after the introduction of
the heavy-duty pneumatic “balloon” tires during the early 1920s. Buses
were also safer since they could pull in to the curb to discharge passengers,
whereas streetcars let passengers off in the center of the street. In 1914,
streetcars provided 100 percent of US cities’ public transportation, but by
1937, only 4 percent of US cities with public transportation were served by
only streetcars; 50 percent of cities were served only by buses. A final cause
of streetcar decline was that automobile ownership grew from 8.1 million in
1920 to 23.1 million in 1929 (Slater 1997). Occasionally, the demise of the
streetcar was celebrated—Figure 1 shows the literal burning of the last
streetcar in Burlington, Vermont, in August 1929, with people celebrating
their “liberation” from the streetcar and the lure of the freedom and inde-
pendence of the automobile (Vermont Historical Society 2004).
Research Frontiers: Typologies, Temporalities,
and Users of LTS
As the examples above illustrate, the evolution and progression of LTS can
involve both multidimensional and interactive phases and mechanisms. In
some situations, users can change their preferences away from a particular
technology that invokes contestation or decline, such as a preference for
cars leading to the decline of railways. In still others, systems reconfigura-
tion occurs strategically and dynamically, interconnecting with other LTS,
cherry-picking customers, or repositioning business models or services
provided.
Clearly, LTS are diverse in their functions, subcomponents, services,
users, institutions, discourses, contextual drivers, and struggles. Toward
that end, we offer three directions for new research. This list is not exhaus-
tive; our intent is to push and provoke more refined and reflective thinking
about LTS methodology, theory, and empirical application.
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Dichotomies and Typologies of LTS
In his review of the literature, Van der Vleuten (2006) offers multiple ways
one can classify LTS. One can demarcate systems by their technical, geo-
graphical, economic, and institutional properties, the result of which could
be typologies or pathways of development patterns. For instance, electricity
grids and railways have specific networks; maritime navigation, telecom-
munication, and air traffic use nature-based links to interconnect to human-
built nodes; others such as postal systems use existing networks to link
artificial nodes. Some LTS are grid based, such as electricity and rail,
whereas others are loosely coupled, such as water control or aviation. LTS
can even compete with each other for the “five Ps” of price, performance,
political pressure, legal protections, and propaganda.
Other ways of categorizing LTS center on openness, capital and labor, or
layering. Both Sovacool (2010) and Kraemer (2006) argue that systems can
be characterized as “open” (more inclusive, democratic, flexible, and
decentralized) or “closed” (exclusive and proprietary, authoritarian, rigid,
and centralized). Some LTS are more capital- or labor-intensive than others,
taking longer to build and being more obdurate to change, such as canals
Figure 1. A “funeral pyre” for an Electric Street Trolley in Vermont, 1929.
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versus naval shipping networks, or flight paths for airplanes. Another dis-
tinction is between “first-order” and “second-order” LTS: second-order
LTS are constructed by combining familiar first order LTS to create a new
network or function. Braun and Joerges (1994) use the example of a trans-
border organ transplant system. This is a second-order system, as it relies on
the blending of national medical systems (hospitals), telecommunications
systems (satellites and mobile phones), and energy and transport systems
(helicopters, planes, cars, etc.). The integration of European militaries into a
holistic system of industrial mass warfare during World War I is another
example of a second-order system requiring the integration of command
structures, contractors, railways, and information systems such as tele-
graphs and telephones (Bucholz 1994). Other examples of second-order
LTS include mass tourism, global stock exchanges, and shipping container
systems, all erected “on top of” existing transport, communication, or
energy systems (Van der Vleuten 2006).
This leads us to ask: which typologies of LTS offer the most explanatory
power or rigor? How can we test, validate, or challenge such typologies
with empirical data? Do new typologies arise as LTS enter the phases we
elaborate above such as reconfiguration, contestation, and decline? Which
typologies are most or least likely to induce infrastructure change? What
implications does this have on accelerating or overcoming change?
Temporalities of System Progression
The temporality of LTS is a second key area deserving of more analysis. We
have begun to sketch some of the later phases of “mature” LTS in this
article, but even so, historical LTS may differ fundamentally from contem-
porary LTS, which may differ further still from the LTS that humanity will
come to adopt in the future. Most of the examples we provide above are
from 1880 to today. Only flood protection in the United States, coal in the
United Kingdom, and rail privatization in the United Kingdom involve
changes to LTS after 1990. Mature systems may diverge from emerging
systems in the same way an adult’s body differs from a child’s. Hughes
(1983, 1987) also suggests that social scientists have given inadequate
attention to temporality in their analysis of LTS in the past. In his examina-
tion of sociotechnical transitions across energy and transport systems, Sova-
cool (2016) proposes that while the previous historical drivers of transitions
emphasized abundance and changes in supply, the future drivers may shift
to scarcity and changes in demand preferences. Similarly, Kern and Rogge
(2016) suggest that the pace and speed of future transitions across
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sociotechnical systems may be about actively altering the selection envi-
ronment to accelerate change rather than historical patterns of crisis-driven
or market-driven progression.
The temporality of LTS lead us to ask: are changes to LTS bound with
particular innovation environments prevalent within certain periods of his-
tory (e.g., modernity)? How can LTS characterized by path dependence or
momentum embodied in past values be changed in a current context? Are
historical cases predictive of future LTS evolution or merely informative?
Which policy mixes can dismantle or actively phase out undesirable mature
systems so as to provoke their decline? Do sociotechnical systems evolved
in the deeper past respond differently from those created today? Are dif-
ferent typologies needed for historical versus modern or future LTS?
Users beyond System Builders
We classify LTS as a structure-centered theory that also has compelling
relational elements incorporating agency and meaning. Agency is dis-
cussed, but often via the notion of system builders. Recent work, however,
has begun to elaborate more refined ways that users may exert influence
over sociotechnical change (Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003) and thus LTS
progression. Kivimaa and Martiskainen (2017) and Martiskainen (2017),
for example, identify “user intermediaries” (actors or users who influence
other users or the selection environment), whereas Parag and Janda (2014)
discuss the role of “middle-out actors” in sociotechnical change. Schot,
Kanger, and Verbong (2016) argue that at least five types of users exist:
 User-producers create new technical and organizational solutions;
 User-intermediaries shape the needs and desires of users as well as
products, infrastructures, and regulatory frameworks;
 User-citizens engage in politics of regime shift lobbying for a par-
ticular niche;
 User-legitimators shape the values and worldview of niche actors;
 User-consumers appropriate products and services and thus produc-
ing meaning and purpose, and testing new systems.
Within these categories, intermediary users come closer to “system
builders” as they shape a mediation junction but are not limited as such.
Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum (2009) add that some users may leverage
resources to create new or transform existing institutions; Johnstone, Stir-
ling, and Sovacool (2017) retort that other users may attempt to capture
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resources to further entrench patterns of incumbency. Hoogma and Schot
(2001) differentiate “lead users” from others in terms of their competency,
resourcefulness, and enthusiasm for innovation; Lindsay (2003) discusses
“reflexive users” who imagine and define future users (and applications) in
their own image.Users can even actively resist and opposeparticular LTS such
as telephones and rural electricity networks (Kline 2003) or smart meters for
gas and electricity (Kahma and Matschoss 2017; Sovacool et al. 2017).
And so we ask: how does such diversity in users affect LTS evolution,
both in early stages (invention, growth) and in later phases (contestation,
decline)? Are more elaborate typologies of users needed? What influences
the impression held by system builders of who the legitimate users of the
system are, including when there are user-system builders?
Conclusion
We maintain that many LTS can progress through not only the Hughesian
phases of (1) invention and development, (2) expansion and adaptation, (3)
system growth, (4) momentum and path dependence, and (5) technological
style but also (6) reconfiguration, (7) contestation, and (8) stagnation and
decline summarized by Figure 2. Perhaps obviously, not all LTS will ever
make it through all eight phases; for example, some can remain in a
Invention and 
development
Expansion and 
adaptation
System 
growth
Momentum 
and path 
dependence
Technological 
style
Reconfiguration 
Contestation
Drift
Crisis
Stagnation and 
decline
Can create feedback loops to 
all other phases
Figure 2. Eight conceptual phases of large technical systems. Source: Authors.
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perpetual cycle between contestation and reconfiguration. Moreover, the
phases are not always sequential; feedback loops often exist between phases
that push systems across the spectrum, not necessarily in a linear order,
something depicted in the figure with its arrows. Nor are the phases as neat
as we imply; we deploy them here to illustrate where a particular set of
mechanisms are most dominant; elements of phases or particular mechan-
isms are often present across other phases and mechanisms. The dotted
areas between contestation and stagnation and decline also indicate that
many systems will never enter full decline—they will simply be shocked
back into reconfiguration.
The cases discussed in this study illustrate not only the presence of these
eight phases but also the complexity of paths of progression and change.
Our framework builds on these complexities, emphasizing the dynamism
and coevolution of our phases of development, which is why the dotted
lines in the Figure 2 indicate that only some LTS progress to actual decline.
Nevertheless, there is a stylized element to our eight phases—not all LTS
may traverse through them, and development will often be sporadic and
episodic. Put another way, both the ascent and the fall of LTS will shift
based on variation and selection processes. Also, evolutionary change
includes variation, selection, and retention.
Furthermore, our study suggests that path dependence should not be
understood to mean that systems are simply locked in or obdurate, but that
continuity is a constant mobilization of resources by those that are advan-
taged by the present system, who may seek to protect and maintain their
advantages (Sorensen 2015, 28). Moments of reconfiguration, contesta-
tion, and decline can “open them up” to inquiry, challenge, and significant
change. Van der Vleuten (2006) adds that as mature systems may resist
change, strategies do exist to exert pressure and alter system dynamics—
these can range from setting up protected spaces for niches to grow,
facilitating participative technology assessment methods, and identifying
internal points of pressure such as congestion, or external points of pres-
sure such as major political events or crises.
Future research is needed to test, validate, and further explore insights
offered by our framework. More refined typologies of LTS subcomponents,
layers, functions, and patterns of development deserve consideration. More
reflexive thinking on the temporalities of LTS evolution as well as the
complexity of users would also be fruitful. An important next step would
be tracing the progression of a single system, or a series of LTS, through our
eight phases. Another would be showing the coevolution of systems, and
how different LTS may evolve together in interdependent or independent
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ways. At times, they may overlap at junctions. Yet another would be testing
our framework with original data gleaned from interviews, surveys, or focus
groups—input that could come from system builders or historians. Further
paths for future development could include developing the framework into
an active tool to assist policy intervention in these notoriously complicated
and vitally important systems. These ideas underscore the themes of non-
linearity, variation, and complexity in LTS evolution.
The previous century has shown that fully established LTS rarely
undergo full decline or displacement. As a result, understanding the
mechanisms and characteristics of reconfiguration and contestation, intro-
duced in this paper, is crucial to supporting and interacting with these
society-shaping systems.
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